Executive Summary

This report provides the results of a second, more thorough review of physical security on Naval installations as directed by Secretary of the Navy memorandum "Base, Station, and Installation Physical Security Assessment" of October 11, 2013. This second review expanded on the joint Navy and Marine Corps "quick look" assessment completed September 27, 2013, and determined whether current procedures are appropriate and adequate, and recommends what enhancements, improvements and innovations should be taken in the future. Both the previous "quick look" assessment and this more in-depth review are separate from all other investigations related to the fatal shooting at the Washington Navy Yard.

Navy Review

Navy Fleet Commanders assess a command's compliance with established guidance and directives primarily through periodic higher headquarters assessments and exercises. In the "quick look" assessment, U.S. Fleet Forces reported that the Navy was "in compliance with physical security protection standards." That assessment was based on a review of available data from antiterrorism program assessments and exercises completed over the past three years, which indicated installations have in place appropriate policies and procedures to execute their antiterrorism program satisfactorily and to establish an appropriate force protection posture.

During the course of this more extensive review, it became apparent that operational execution of program requirements varies and that not all installations are meeting fully the requirements of their antiterrorism plans and other installation policy directives. This is the result of existing force protection assessment processes which focus exclusively on antiterrorism program administration and do not evaluate an installation's ability to operationally execute that program at the tactical level. In January, 2013, U.S. Fleet Forces recognized this shortfall, and established the Higher Headquarters Antiterrorism Operational Assessment, which is specifically designed to close this gap by focusing primarily on operational execution versus administrative compliance. Since January 2013, 15 of 51 Navy defined CONUS installations (29.4%) have completed this operational assessment.

In this review U.S. Fleet Forces also found the need for the Navy's force protection program to better connect assessment, readiness reporting and risk analysis to resourcing. Below are the major findings and recommendations that U.S. Fleet Forces believe will move toward that end. Lesser findings can be found in Enclosure (1). It is recommended OPNAV validate these findings and recommendations and in the process of doing so, identify the cost of each recommendation and evaluate to what extent they will mitigate the stated findings.

Key Navy Findings and Recommendations

- **Finding 1.1. (Doctrine/Policy)** The Navy's force protection program does not effectively connect the elements of assessment, readiness reporting and risk analysis to resourcing. *Recommendation 1.1.1.* Establish an oversight process to review and assess installation force protection readiness based on all risk components including threat, vulnerability and criticality.

Ensure assessment results are used in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process and execution year resourcing plans.

Recommendation 1.1.2. Improve Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy reporting to assist Commanders in quantifying risk, based on estimates of threat, criticality and vulnerability.

Recommendation 1.1.3. Establish Force Protection as a separate capability area in Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy for afloat units and integrate with ashore units.

- **Finding 1.2. (Doctrine/Policy)** Prior to January, 2013, Navy force protection assessment processes focused exclusively on antiterrorism program administration and did not evaluate an installation's ability to operationally execute that program at the tactical level.

  Recommendation 1.2.1. Continue development and implementation of the Higher Headquarters Antiterrorism Operational Assessment and Installation Protection Assessment Cell processes.

  Recommendation 1.2.2. Develop a formal periodic feedback mechanism to ensure senior Fleet and installation enterprise leaders at the right level have visibility into deficiencies and vulnerabilities, and the status of associated corrective actions.

- **Finding 1.7. (Organization)** The Navy's organizational construct with respect to its requirements and resourcing strategy for force protection adversely affects organizing (manning), training, equipping and operational execution.

  Recommendation 1.7. Establish a single, independent force protection resource sponsor, with the authority and responsibility to manage and fund all aspects of the Navy's force protection program.

- **Finding 1.8. (Organization)** The current command and control structure--with Commander, Navy Installations Command executing administrative control and Fleet Commanders executing tactical control for force protection--creates a seam between mission accountability (actual risk) and budgetary authority (programmatic risk).

  Recommendation 1.8. Align Echelon II ashore force protection resourcing and execution responsibilities.

- **Finding 1.9. (Organization)** The Navy does not optimally task-organize its security forces, nor does it provide security professionals (Master-at-Arms and Security Officers) the training, community management and career pipeline afforded by other Department of Defense services for their respective security professionals.

  Recommendation 1.9.1. Develop a standardized task organization to optimize Navy Security Force unity of command and unity of effort.

  Recommendation 1.9.2. Assess the Navy Master-at-Arms "A" School curriculum compared to other Services to determine if it is properly scoped--and correspondingly, of adequate length.

  Recommendation 1.9.3. Establish a career pipeline for Navy Security Officers with clearly defined career training objectives based on formally identified training requirements established by the Fleet Commanders and Commander, Navy Installations Command.

  Recommendation 1.9.4. Improve the community management of Master-at-Arms by providing more advanced training, and defining career progression goals that will better develop Navy Security Force professionalism and competence.

- **Finding 1.10. (Training)** The Navy small arms qualification program is not optimally aligned to post-9/11 force protection watch standing requirements and creates a process which places unnecessary burdens on commanders.

  Recommendation 1.10.1. Determine the aggregate Navy demand for small arms ranges--and the capabilities of current ranges in place--and adjust Navy range capacity, as necessary.

Recommendation 1.10.2. Conduct a Limited Objective Experiment to determine the most advantageous capabilities of small arms simulators and to what extent their use may improve the Navy's Small Arms Training and Qualification Program.

Recommendation 1.10.3. Establish a small arms simulator program of record.

Recommendation 1.10.4. Revise small arms qualification criteria to define the required proficiency standard.

Recommendation 1.10.5. Research and identify a universal weapons electronic training and qualification system capable of maintaining each armed watchstander's weapons training and qualification throughout their career, as well as producing an input to the Defense Readiness Reporting System-Navy to give commands accurate readiness information.

Recommendation 1.10.6. Enhance Small Arms Instructor and Line Coach curricula and qualification to ensure Navy Security Forces and force protection watchstanders receive standardized fundamental training in practical shooting elements such as shoot and move, use of barricades, weak hand rifle and pistol shooting and transition from primary (rifle) to secondary (pistol). Include additional dry fire instruction and one-on-one coaching to provide immediate feedback.

Recommendation 1.10.7. Review current watchstander arming requirements to determine if the number of personnel requiring small arms proficiency can be reduced.

Recommendation 1.10.8. Qualify Navy Security Forces to specific OPNAVINST 3591 standards based on individual post requirements.

Recommendation 1.10.9. Adjust Non-Combat Expenditure Allocation to train Navy Security Forces based on the outcome of a Limited Objective Experiment in order to meet proficiency standards vice arbitrary minimum qualification standards.

- **Finding 1.18. (Personnel)** The Navy does not have sufficient organic escort capacity to meet the requirements of OPNAVINST 3380.5 "High Value Unit Transit Protection Operations."

  Recommendation 1.18. Assess options and identify solutions to establish Navy High Value Unit transit escort capability for FY15 and beyond.

- **Finding 1.19. (Personnel)** For installations within the continental United States, security forces are currently manned at less than 80 percent of the validated requirement.

  Recommendation 1.19.1. Man installation security departments to Mission Profile Validation-Protection requirements.

  Recommendation 1.19.2. Relocate Master-at-Arms serving in identified misaligned billets to those where they provide the most effective and efficient readiness and capability.

  Recommendation 1.19.3. Review ashore tenant command security requirements. Realign redundant security forces across the force and/or conduct a budget based transfer from the tenant command to the installation security department.

- **Finding 1.20. (Personnel)** The Mission Profile Validation-Protection model does not account for limited duty or otherwise not "Fit for Full Duty" Navy Security Force personnel.

  Recommendation 1.20. Determine additional manpower required and impacts to global manning distribution if installations were manned at 105-110 percent of the Mission Profile Validation-Protection requirement.

- **Finding 14.2. (Doctrine/Policy)** Although the Navy's vetting and credentialing procedures used for base access and security clearances by the Department of the Navy are in accordance with Department of Defense policy and directives, those processes may not adequately mitigate the potential for insider attack.

Recommendation 14.2.1. Review periodicity requirements and methodology for security clearance eligibility of active duty military personnel, government service civilians and contractors.

Recommendation 14.2.2. Determine whether periodic background vetting is warranted for military family members, military retirees and civil service retirees to enable continued installation access.

Recommendation 14.2.3. Determine the necessity for migration to Common Access Cards for current TESLIN populations to enable authentication at a high level of trust and deployment of future physical access control systems.

Recommendation 14.2.4. Review the Continuous Evaluation Program to determine if current evaluation criteria and processes can be improved to better mitigate the insider threat.

Marine Corps Review

The Marine Corps conducted a review of installation security expanding on the "Quick Look" assessment. Using the analytical framework of Doctrine; Operations; Training; Materiel; Leadership; Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to identify gaps or shortfalls that affect security program execution, this review was expanded to include recruiting and reserve force installations and activities, in addition to major installations worldwide. During this assessment, the following key themes emerged:

- Vetting and credentialing are fundamental to security program execution
- The unpredictable and erratic nature of the Insider Threat presents a significant challenge
- Force protection efforts and continuous evaluation programs must cover multiple populations to include all Service members, civilian personnel, contractors, family members, retirees and visitors
- The Marine Corps Installation Command and Installation commanders, in concert with Service leadership, must balance available resources in order to prioritize and mitigate risk
- Personal weapons ownership by Service members is protected by public law and Commanders are limited in their authority to account for personal weapons

The Marine Corps is generally compliant with physical security program mandates with risk mitigation measures in place to offset gaps and shortfalls. The Anti-terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) and supporting Mission Assurance framework (to include physical security and access control) reasonably protect the force (to include civilians, contractors, family members and visitors aboard Marine Corps Installations), systematically assess and manage enterprise risk, synchronize protection related programs and activities, and prioritize investments given available resources. Known gaps and shortfalls are under review for mitigation. In accordance with this review, the following recommendations are provided;

Marine Corps Key Recommendations
Section 1: Vetting and Credentialing
- **Doctrine:** Mandate that all National Agency Check and Law and Credit Check (NACLC) investigations be adjudicated before a Marine completes basic training. (Marine Corps)
- **Doctrine:** Expand the Continuous Evaluation Program (CEP) to ensure greater vetting across all Marine Corps populations. (Marine Corps)

- **Doctrine:** Implement DoN Rapid Review recommendations to improve security clearance processes. Include a final adjudication of a Marine's access suitability in Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) upon retirement or discharge from service. (DoN)
- **Training:** Add CEP training to every Commanders Course to improve leadership understanding of and compliance with Continuous Evaluation Program policy and reporting requirements. (Marine Corps)
- **Leadership:** Ensure adherence to vetting and credentialing policies at all levels of command. (Marine Corps)

Section 2: Access Control

- **Organization:** Improve collaboration between PP&O, MCICOM, I&L, and C4 in order to enhance oversight of installation entry point upgrade prioritization, funding, and design. (Marine Corps)
- **Organization:** Achieve adequate manpower staffing levels for law enforcement and security personnel or identify actionable options to mitigate capability and capacity gaps. (Marine Corps)
- **Materiel:** Expedite approval to field a DoD physical access control system (PACS) that will help security personnel vet visitors more efficiently and meets DoD requirements. (DoD)

Section 3: Insider Threat

- **Doctrine:** Implement Department-wide standard guidelines for behavioral indicators to support continuous evaluation. (DoD)
- **Doctrine:** Clarify and improve Service-wide guidelines for information sharing between installation commanders and tenant/activity commanders, related to background investigations and the continuous evaluation program. (Marine Corps)
- **Doctrine:** Establish the Marine Corps Insider Threat Analysis Cell to gather and analyze information related to possible threats by personnel accessing Marine Corps installations. (Marine Corps)
- **Training:** Expand instructor-led and web-based training to all Marines, civilians, contractors and family members to spot and report warning signs and indicators of potential violence. (Marine Corps)
- **Training:** Develop violence prevention training with special considerations for recruiters and other Marine Corps personnel who work in locations and facilities not under Marine Corps control. (Marine Corps)
- **Training:** Develop and expand installation exercises to ensure all personnel aboard an installation, not just first responders, understand active shooter response procedures. (Marine Corps)

Section 4: Technology Enhancements

- **Materiel:** Field an enterprise wide system to link vetting and credentialing of individuals with authoritative databases. (DoD)
- **Materiel:** Field the Automated Continuous Evaluation System. Ensure it includes all relevant population groups, and is properly resourced across the Department. (DoD)
- **Materiel:** Identify a material solution for portable repeaters to assist in interior communications coverage to compliment ongoing efforts to improve overall military first responder communication capabilities through radio frequency infrastructure coverage, interoperable equipment, and multi-band radio fielding. (DoD)

Section 5: Personal Weapons

- **Training:** Conduct a public information campaign on the registration, transportation and storage of personal weapons aboard installations. Utilize the Corps' theme of "Reawakening" to emphasize leadership and individual responsibility for proper personal weapons ownership, registration, storage, and recreational use. (Marine Corps)
- **Materiel:** Examine workable and cost-effective means to screen incoming traffic for unauthorized weapons. (DoD)
- **Leadership:** Examine and address consistency of service policies, and recommend broad measures to standardize and synchronize policies across the military services. (DoD)

Section 6: Reserve Centers and Recruiting Stations

- **Organization:** Expand mission assurance assessments to include Reserve training centers. (Marine Corps)
- **Training:** Develop violence prevention and physical security training with special considerations for recruiters and other Marine Corps personnel who work in locations and facilities not under Marine Corps control. (Marine Corps)
- **Materiel:** Develop a master plan for cost-effective options to mitigate gaps in Reserve training centers' physical security and access control measures. (Marine Corps)

Section 7: Funding Security

- **Doctrine:** Sign the Mission Assurance policy and implement complementary direction across the service. (Marine Corps)
- **Training:** Improve commander's understanding of the Mission Assurance program and its relevance to not only installation security but how efforts across tenant operating force units complement an all-hazards approach to security. (Marine Corps)
- **Materiel**: Identify requisite funding for installation security programs and ensure funding is protected from reallocation. (Marine Corps)
- **Materiel:** Fund the Mission Assurance Assessment Team program. (Marine Corps)
- **Leadership:** Develop a Security Infrastructure Campaign Plan (SICP) for CMC approval to ensure entry control points are brought up to required standards by 2020. (Marine Corps)
- **Personnel:** Staff law enforcement and security personnel at the CMC high risk posture manpower staffing levels. (Marine Corps)

Summary

Our review revealed points of concern in organizational alignment, separation of mission accountability and resource authority; assessment effectiveness, feedback mechanisms and readiness reporting; and manning and resource shortfalls. Balancing security measures with mission requirements to achieve an appropriate and reasonable level of security that supports mission execution without unduly affecting the workforce always remains a challenge. However, we believe the strategic interests of Navy and Marine Corps missions and forces can be preserved by closing the gaps and seams identified in this report through targeted resource investments and carefully considered risk management. Enclosures (1) and (2) provide additional information on these findings and recommendations.

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